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I. INTRODUCTION
Jeremy Bentham, the famous British philosopher who is often credited as the founding 
father of utilitarianism, dedicated much of his life to the realization of a Panopticon. This was 
a prison where, through the use of mirrors, inmates could be observed all the time without 
them being able to tell whether they were being watched or not. Because they were unaware 
of whether the gaoler was watching them or not, the prisoners would always behave properly. 
(Semple, 1993, p. 20-41) Embittered by years of failed struggle to start an experimental 
Panopticon, Bentham abandoned the project with the following words: “I have sown the seed; 
but the harvest I fear, is for another age.” (Semple, 1993, p. 38)
Bentham appears to have been right about the harvest coming in another age. Slowly 
but surely, governments of Western countries are building their own Panopticons. The 
subjects are not criminals, but all citizens. And the citizens are not in prison, but in their own 
homes and on their own streets. Technological progress allows governments to collect more 
and more information about us. Where we are at any given time, how often we travel to a 
certain place, and what things are of interest to us. Even fifteen years ago, Richard Spinello 
wrote about “the end of privacy”. (Spinello, 1997) 
Although I am not as cynical of the state of our privacy as Spinello, and I do not think 
we are actually living in a modern day Panopticon, government is learning more and more 
about us, thereby reducing the privacy that we have. And just like the inmates in Bentham’s 
prison, we might one day find ourselves in a situation where we feel like we have to behave 
exactly like our goalers desire. 
In reality things are not that bad, and everyone can enjoy some amount of privacy in 
their lives. Yet we can see that the government is increasing its efforts to monitor how we 
behave: through security cameras, phone taps and by analyzing our e-mails. We are often told 
that it is in our best interest: that we have to sacrifice some of our privacy so the government 
can do a better job at preventing criminals from harming us and stealing from us. 
One might say that security, which is the protection of individuals against violence, 
crime and terrorism, is the most important task of any government. This idea is confirmed by 
a strong tradition in political theory: for Thomas Hobbes, the only reason that we established 
states is to protect ourselves from each other. By giving power to an absolute authority (the 
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Leviathan), we exchange all our liberty for security. However, in a lot of cases an increase of 
security is only possible when it is combined with a decrease of liberty, which we also value. 
In political theory, the clash between liberty and security is a classic one. Several 
authors have tried to find a balance between the two, with very different conclusions. In the 
case of privacy, the clash between liberty and security is important because privacy is a form 
of liberty, and the privacy of individuals is usually restricted to increase security. It seems to 
me that privacy is something that should be valued, and that individuals have a right to 
privacy. Therefore, a decrease of privacy is always undesirable. However, a decrease of 
privacy might be excusable if there are enough positive consequences for our security. This 
means that there are certain necessary conditions that should be fulfilled before we can call a 
decrease of privacy of individuals justifiable. The main task of this thesis will be to 
investigate what these conditions are. So my main research question will be: 
Which conditions should be fulfilled for governments to be justified to restrict the privacy of 
individuals?
To answer this question, several underlying questions have to be answered. First and 
foremost, privacy and security are abstract concepts, and should be carefully defined before I 
can start discussing them. Hence, my first sub-question will be: 
How should we define privacy and security?
I think everyone will agree that privacy and security are essential to human beings. We 
might even say that we have a right to both privacy and security. If this is the case, it will 
certainly be important for the answer to my main research question. So my second sub-
question is:
To what extent do we have a right to privacy and a right to security?
Simply determining that we have these rights isn't enough, of course. In a lot of 
situations, these rights will clash and upholding one will have to take precedence over 
upholding the other. So to continue our discussion, I have to analyse how the right to privacy 
and the right to security relate to each other. My third sub-question will be: 
How should we act when privacy and security conflict?
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When privacy and security are in conflict, a key issue is in whose interest they are. 
Those whose privacy is restricted are not always the ones who benefit from the alleged 
increase in security, and vice versa. So I will take a good look at this, and then answer my 
fourth sub-question:
Whose interests are playing a role in conflicts between privacy and security?
In the final chapter of this thesis I will answer my main research question and provide 
some suggestions for future research.
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II. DEFINING PRIVACY AND SECURITY
Before we can start comparing the importance of privacy and security we should first 
determine what precisely is meant by those terms. Especially privacy is a highly volatile and 
elusive concept, and political philosophers disagree about what it exactly is and whether it 
even exists. Security is a somewhat less complicated concept, but to avoid confusion along 
the way I will also clarify what it means.
In this chapter I will define privacy and security, and I will address two problems that 
arise when we want to “measure” how much privacy an individual has.
1) What is privacy?
Many authors have attempted to define privacy. In this chapter, I will discuss some 
relevant concepts of privacy. However, before I start defining privacy, I will first deal with the 
most serious critique of privacy: reductionism. (DeCew, 2002) The idea of reductionism is 
that there is no such thing as privacy. Whenever someone is talking about privacy, he is 
actually talking about some other right that he believes to be important. The most well-known 
reductionist theory is that of Judith Thomson, who gives the example of a man who owns a 
pornographic picture and keeps it hidden in a safe. Breaking into the safe and looking at the 
picture would certainly be a violation of privacy. According to Thomson, this claim on a 
violation of privacy is derived from other rights: rights that come from the possession of the 
picture. (Thomson, 1975, p.299) Privacy is therefore reducible: every part of privacy can be 
derived from another right. This reduces privacy to nothing more than a 'front', an umbrella 
right that is only based on other rights. Talking about privacy and basing legislation on its 
apparent violation is only confusing: according to Thomson we should simply talk about the 
underlying rights. 
I would argue that there are three ways to refute this argument. First of all, Thomson 
can only sustain her theory by assuming that a different right is violated. In the case of the 
pornographic picture, she states that the violation is a violation of property, because 
individuals have a right not to have their property looked at. However, as Thomas Scanlon 
persuasively argues, if I borrowed it from a friend and I use it with his permission, my privacy 
is still violated, even though the picture is not mine and I therefore have no possession rights. 
(Scanlon, 1975, p.318) This shows that a violation of privacy can occur without any 
underlying rights being violated.
A second argument is about the reducibility of principles. William Parent argues that 
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Thomson tries to base her argument on the existence of a lot of rights, some of which are 
quite difficult to prove. (Parent, 1983, p.279) The right not to be looked at, for example, is 
questionable at best. If we were to dissect such a right, we might find the same underlying 
principles as for privacy. This suggests that the reductionist theory makes analyzing and 
discussing rights unnecessarily complicated.
Finally, even if Thomson is right, and privacy is merely an umbrella term for a cluster 
of other rights, the concept of privacy still has merit in discussions about policy. For example, 
when we are arguing about installing more cameras on street corners so the police are more 
successful in fighting crime, it is much easier to talk about the umbrella concept of privacy 
than discussing all of the rights that would have to be discussed in a reductionist discussion 
that tries to avoid using the word ‘privacy’. Most rights are related: autonomy is closely 
related to liberty, bodily integrity is closely linked to human dignity, and so on. There are no 
irreducible, ultimate values, and we don't have to refrain from using privacy as a useful 
concept because of it.
What then is privacy? I would argue that privacy is a condition that we can ascribe to 
human beings. Just like we can call 'being red' a property of a red sweater, we can call 'having 
privacy' a property of a human being. And just like there are a lot of different shades of red, 
there are a lot different states a person’s privacy can be in. I can be in a state of perfect 
privacy, in a state of no privacy, and somewhere in between. It is not hard to find examples of 
these different states: a hermit living all by himself in a small house in the woods, with 
nobody knowing that he lives there and nobody even being aware of his existence, can be said 
to be in a state of perfect privacy. A person who is displayed on a platform at a crowded 
square, completely naked, with all his personal information displayed on a large television 
screen for everyone to see, can be said to have almost no privacy. 
Of course, almost nobody in the world is in one of these extreme situations. We are all 
somewhere in between these two. Some of us are more like the hermit, and others are more 
like the naked man on the platform. This shows that privacy is not a dichotomous property, 
but is a matter of degree. In this sense, privacy is akin to concepts like liberty and autonomy.
Even though everyone will agree that the hermit has a lot of privacy while the publicly 
exposed naked man doesn’t, we still have not discussed what privacy actually is. If we want 
to know how certain policies can influence the privacy that individuals have, we must 
determine what privacy is and how we can actually measure it.
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There are several definitions of privacy in philosophical literature. I will deal with the 
two that are most prominent. The first one is defended by (among others) Parent, who argues 
that privacy can be defined as the control over information about oneself. The second one is 
defended by (among others) Ruth Gavison, who argues that privacy can be defined as the 
control over access to oneself (where access also includes information). I will argue that both 
definitions are correct to some extent, but they are also wrong on certain points. 
Privacy as the control over information about oneself is a concept that is defended by 
Parent. He gives the following definition of privacy: “Privacy is the condition of not having 
undocumented personal knowledge about one possessed by others. A person's privacy is 
diminished exactly to the degree that others possess this kind of knowledge about him.” 
(Parent, 1983, p. 269) He also argues that, when it comes to privacy, 'knowledge' can only be 
understood as facts, since falsehoods are already condemnable as libel or slander.
There are two elements in this approach to privacy that are wrong. The first element is 
the statement that there is only a decrease of privacy when the published information was 
previously undocumented: “What [already] belongs to the public domain cannot without 
glaring paradox be called private; consequently it should not be incorporated within our 
concept of privacy.” (Parent, 1983, p.271) The problem with this statement however, is that it 
does not appreciate the significance of the accessibility of certain publications. If I find a 
piece of private information about a famous politician in a fifty year old newspaper article that 
is currently unknown to the wide public, there is certainly a decrease of the politician’s 
privacy when I give the information to a journalist who publishes it in the New York Times. 
The more accessible the private information is, the less privacy a person has. (DeCew, 1997, 
p.30) 
In the same way there is a difference between only one or two friends knowing about 
my sexual preferences, or the entire country knowing it. In both cases the information may 
have been documented (for example, in the diary of one of my friends in the former case and 
in a recent national newspaper in the latter), but this does not change the vast difference 
between the first privacy violation and the second. But whether it has been documented before 
or not is relevant for the amount of privacy that the subject loses. If I tell a friend about the 
story I have read in a prominent national newspaper about a celebrity’s drug use, and millions 
of readers already know about the drug use, there is less of a privacy violation than if I told 
my friend the story if it wouldn’t have been in the papers. So accessibility is relevant, but it 
can be argued that Parent is wrong because he believes private information can be in only one 
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of two states: documented and undocumented. There is a vast grey area between those two 
states, because of the role of accessibility.
A second problem with Parent's theory is his statement that there is only a decrease of 
privacy when the information is true. The problem with this view is that when certain private 
information is published about someone, this person can be forced into a position where he 
has to involuntarily release private information in order to disprove the previously spread 
falsehoods. Consider the following example of a politician who is not having an affair. The 
public does not know anything about the politician’s love life, and the politician intends to 
keep it that way because he believes his love life is private. When a journalist publishes an 
article claiming the politician is actually having an affair, the politician might feel forced to 
prove that the story is wrong in order to rectify the falsehood that has been spread. So even 
though no true information is released by the journalist, the privacy of the politician has been 
indirectly diminished.
Gavison defines privacy in a different way. “Our interest in privacy [...] is related to 
our concern over our accessibility to others: the extent to which we are known to others, the 
extent to which others have physical access to us, and to the extent to which we are the 
subject of others' attention.” (Gavison, 1980, p.423) She believes that privacy exists of three 
independent and irreducible parts: secrecy, anonymity, and solitude. (Gavison, 1980, p.434) 
When an individual is completely inaccessible to anyone else, he enjoys perfect privacy (and 
therefore also perfect secrecy, perfect anonymity and perfect solitude). However, the problem 
with Gavison's definition is that although 'physical access' and 'attention' may look like being 
different from the 'information' aspect, I think they are essentially the same elements, which 
makes her theory of privacy as control over access nothing more than a theory of privacy as 
control over information.
Gavison argues that physical access is distinct from knowledge, which is true. Yet if 
we look at it closely, we can see that it doesn't differ that much from knowledge. It seems to 
me that 'physical access' consists of two different sorts of access. If there would be any 
physical contact, I don't see that as a decrease of privacy, but as a violation of bodily integrity. 
When someone who is both blind and deaf hits another person, he will obtain no information 
about the person. But he will violate a right to bodily integrity and definitely has physical 
access, yet he does not decrease the amount of privacy the subject has. On the other hand, 
when there is no physical contact but merely proximity, what would be objectionable to 
physical access? Physical proximity simply makes it easier to obtain information about 
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someone else. If our blind and deaf person would be quietly sitting next to you on a park 
bench, would that be a decrease of your privacy? I don’t think it is. Although he has physical 
access to you (expressed as proximity), the simple fact that he won't be able to observe you 
(so he can't obtain any information) guarantees that he does not decrease your privacy.
The second element that Gavison distinguishes from knowledge is attention. She uses 
the example of the president walking the streets incognito. If one were to shout “Here is the 
president”, the president would lose his anonymity and everyone would give him attention. 
(Gavison, 1980, p.432) This is not in any way different from obtaining knowledge. One 
obtains information by paying attention to someone. In the example of the incognito 
president, revealing his identity would give persons all kinds of information about the 
president, such as shops that he had just visited, or the piece of information that the president 
apparently likes to walk on the streets in disguise. The reason that someone wants to remain 
anonymous is that he does not want anyone to get information about him. Thus, attention is 
not different from knowledge.
Another explanation could be that the president wants to be left alone while walking 
the streets. He may be tired of being recognized everywhere he goes and may want to 
experience street life without security guards that are protecting him, cameras filming him and 
citizens wanting to shake his hand. This line of thought is following the definition of privacy 
that was introduced by Supreme Court Justices Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis: “the right 
to be let alone”. (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p. 193) What if the president does not care about 
people knowing that he likes to walk on the streets in disguise, but only wants to keep crowds 
from gathering while he is shopping for groceries? If that is the case, he is not fearing the loss 
of privacy itself, but the consequences of the privacy loss. Crowds will only gather once they 
have obtained the information that the president is walking in their near vicinity. 
Consequently ‘being let alone’ is a result of having privacy, not privacy itself. 
To conclude this part of the chapter, I would argue that we can define privacy as the 
condition in which information about oneself is not known by others. The amount of privacy 
that an individual has can therefore be completely measured by how much information about 
him is known by others. In addition, the more accessible this information is to others, the less 
privacy the individual has. Accessibility here can be understood both in terms of active 
accessibility (the ability to find the information if you are specifically looking for it) and 
passive accessibility (when you can be confronted with the information when you are not 
specifically looking for it, for example when it is in the headlines of a national newspaper).
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2) Two problems with measuring privacy
In the beginning of this chapter I called privacy “a volatile and elusive concept.” I did 
this because I believe that it is hard to measure privacy. With measuring I do not mean that we 
actually have to be able to quantify how much privacy I have and how much privacy my 
neighbor has, but we should be able to tell when someone’s privacy has decreased. Surely, 
this is hard to do, because privacy is a highly subjective concept. If we want a concept like 
privacy to have weight in certain decisions about policy, we should be able to deal with the 
subjectivity of privacy. I believe there are two reasons for this subjectivity, and I will discuss 
both.
The first reason is related to the example I gave earlier in this chapter: about privacy 
being a property of a human being like a red color being a property of a sweater. This 
comparison is true in the sense that both ‘privacy’ and ‘red’ can be used to describe the object 
or person. However, it is false in the sense that the redness of the sweater is objective, while 
the privacy of the person is not. We can observe the sweater in a number of ways, and every 
time the conclusion will be that it is red. Of course, someone might disagree and believe it to 
be more of a pink sweater, but this is just the subjective interpretation of how we should name 
the color of the sweater. The color itself does not change, whether someone claims that it is 
blue or not, because the color of the sweater is independent of what we think of it. It is red in 
and of itself.
In this sense, privacy is different. Whether a human can be called ‘private’ is not 
independent of other persons. Privacy is a relational property, one that is determined through 
the interaction with others (or the lack thereof). As a result, the amount of privacy that we 
enjoy can suddenly change. One moment, the hermit in the woods enjoys complete privacy in 
his small hut, the other moment a large group of tourists accidentally finds him. His privacy is 
decreased through interaction with other humans, while the redness of the sweater will not 
change in such a way. 
Since privacy is determined through our interactions with other persons, it is hard to 
objectively measure it. I might believe that I have a lot of privacy when it comes to my 
political convictions, while someone has been telling other people about what party I usually 
vote for behind my back. Privacy can be measured as information, but we cannot objectively 
find out what other people know and whether they possess a piece of private information or 
not. This also makes privacy harder to measure. 
I do not have a definitive solution for the difficulties that arise because of the fact that 
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privacy is determined through interaction with others. But I do not believe that I have to 
provide such a solution here. I am merely contending that these difficulties are real, and that 
they make our discussion about privacy harder.
The second reason that makes privacy volatile and elusive can be found in the words 
“information about oneself” in my definition of privacy. Any piece of information about me 
could fall under the definition. The name of my dog, my political views, my sexual 
preferences, and the color of the sweater I was wearing on May 30th, 2011. It feels strange that 
even meaningless information such as the color of my sweater should fall under a definition 
of privacy. If we were to argue, as I will in the next chapter, that privacy should be protected, 
this will lead to undesirable situations where I can claim that nobody may know anything 
about me.
If we want to protect privacy, we will have to put some restraints upon the concept op 
“information about oneself”. I will do this in the next chapter, where I shall analyze the right 
to privacy. For now, I will state that every piece of information about oneself falls under the 
definition of privacy, even the ones that might seem insignificant. In fact, if we want to 
measure how much privacy one has as objectively as possible, there is no room for normative 
decisions about what kind of information is private and what kind of information is not.
So I do believe that if we want to talk about protecting privacy, we should limit 
“information about oneself” in a way that only information that we actually consider to be 
private is protected. However, when formulating a descriptive definition of privacy I do not 
think these limits are necessary, so my definition does not need to be altered.
3) What is security?
Security is a concept that is less controversial than privacy. While there are people 
who are claiming that privacy is not that significant and that we don’t have a right to privacy, 
almost everyone will agree that individuals should be protected against physical harm. Since 
it is so broadly accepted I will only very briefly discuss my definition of security.
I would argue that security consists of two components. The first component is the 
absence of violation to the physical integrity of a human being. This implies that we are not 
killed, raped, or beaten by other individuals. It is safe to say that almost nobody prefers death 
over life or being beaten over not being beaten. Protection of our physical integrity is usually 
viewed as one of the most important (if not, the most important) tasks of any government. For 
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a lot of philosophers, it even is the only reason that we should have governments at all. For 
Thomas Hobbes, for example, getting out of the miserable and violent state of nature was the 
only reason why we would voluntarily restrain ourselves by subjecting ourselves to the 
authority of a state. (Hobbes, 1651, p. 93)
The second component of security is the protection of property. This would include the 
government preventing other individuals from stealing property that is rightfully and legally 
yours. Because a large part of our lives is devoted to accumulating property and possessions, a 
society where individual property is not secure will be a society in which individuals will not 
feel secure either. Of course, there is a lot of discussion among scholars about property, and 
about how much should be rightfully and legally ours. However, I do not wish to engage in a 
debate about distributive justice here. The possibility to own property is acknowledged in 
virtually any society, and for that reason we can include it in our definition of security.
Are these two components equally important? I would argue they are not. Physical 
integrity is more significant than property, something that almost everyone will confirm. 
Enjoying physical safety without owning property is to be preferred over being a rich man 
who is beaten up on a regular basis. Also, in the first situation it is easier to start gathering 
property than it is to gain physical safety in the second. That physical integrity is more 
important than property is confirmed by a lot of actual discussions about privacy: 
governments usually justify a measure that reduces privacy by an appeal to physical safety, 
because most people would rather be the victim of theft than be murdered.
In conclusion, it seems to me that someone enjoys security when he is free from 
murder, rape, violence, and theft. Not coincidentally, such material phenomena are usually the 
subject of many government measures that decrease individual privacy, such as camera 
surveillance. In fact, that is the reason why I have chosen for this specific definition of 
security. It may not be a perfect definition, but it does provide us with a clear idea what is at 
stake in the debate about privacy and security.
A crucial difference between security and privacy becomes clear at this point. While 
privacy is a rather abstract concept, security is more concrete. This is because privacy is 
expressed through information, while security is much more ‘physical’. It is much easier to 
observe that someone has been murdered than that someone’s privacy has been violated. As I 
have shown above, privacy can be hard to measure for different reasons. Security is not 
troubled by this. If we want to know how secure people are in a certain neighborhood, all we 
have to do is find the statistics about violence and theft and we know what we are dealing 
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with. This makes security more ‘tangible’ than privacy for a lot of people, and this is one of 
the reasons that security is often deemed more important than privacy.
Evidently, there is more to security than physical integrity and property protection. A 
key psychological element also exists: the belief that someone is secure. We can be as secure 
as possible, yet still feel threatened because we believe our security is not guaranteed. And 
vice versa, we can have a strong illusion of safety while there actually is a large chance that 
we will be killed or robbed. Although individuals may usually have an accurate idea of how 
much security they enjoy in their own society, in a lot of situations people may overestimate 
or underestimate threats to their security. Even in a society with almost no crime, people may 
be afraid because the media pay a lot of attention to the relatively few criminal acts that do 
happen. 
The belief of how secure you are is pivotal in discussions about privacy, because it can 
be observed that a lot of government measures are simply in place because they give the 
public an illusion of safety, even though the measures are not contributing to a safer situation 
at all. As Daniel Solove notes about random searches of people’s baggage on the New York 
subway, the measure “seems more symbolic than effective, because the odds of the police 
finding the terrorist with a bomb are so low.” (Solove, 2008, p. 348) However, such symbolic 
measures may still have value, because they might make people feel more secure.
Why is it important that people feel secure? Apparently this is so because it enhances 
the freedom that people have. When you fear that you will be killed or robbed every time you 
walk on the street, you will be less likely to actually walk the streets. And when you believe 
that there is a very high possibility that someone will break into your house to steal your 
television set, you are far less likely to feel relaxed and may not even leave the house as much 
as you’d like to. The psychological consequences of believing you can indeed enjoy society 
are also considerable. When you believe that your physical safety and property are effectively 
protected, you will be more likely to start relationships with other individuals and work to 
accumulate property. 
All this is possible even when the feeling of security is actually an illusion. In that 
sense, ignorance might be bliss. Alternatively, when you are enjoying a high level of security 
but don’t believe that you actually are secure, this will very probably affect you in a negative 
way (which is an interesting explanation why governments usually want to fix this incorrect 
security assessment of society). Obviously, if we would have to prioritize being secure and 
feeling secure, the former would trump the latter. Generally everyone prefers not being 
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murdered above feeling safe about not being murdered. The key issue here is that the feeling 
of security is also relevant in discussions about privacy.
I do not think my definition of security as physical integrity and property protection is 
the only possible definition. However, I would argue that it is adequate enough for our 
discussion about privacy and security, because preventing or punishing violence and theft are 
usually the reasons which governments propose when they want to take measures that reduce 
privacy. 
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III. A RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND A RIGHT TO SECURITY
In the previous chapter I have given definitions of privacy and security, and I now turn 
to both concepts as rights. I will begin with an explanation of what rights are, and will address 
different categories of rights that can be distinguished. Subsequently, I will argue that we 
indeed have a right to privacy and have a right to security as well.
1) What are rights?
Before discussing whether we have a right to privacy and security or not, we must first 
take a closer look at the concept of rights, since noting that I have a right to something raises 
many questions. Why do I have this right? Should everyone respect it, or just certain agents? 
Is it an absolute right that may never be violated? 
To be sure, there are countless definitions of rights. This is not the place for a 
discussion about the exact definition, so I will use one that is appropriate for my purposes: 
“rights are entitlements (not) to perform certain actions, or (not) to be in certain states; or 
entitlements that others (not) perform certain actions or (not) be in certain states.” (Wenar, 
2005) 
I realize there is a lot more to rights than just this definition. Wenar’s definition 
includes different elements that we might call rights. These elements are based on a well-
known categorization of rights by Wesley Hohfeld, who sees four kinds of rights: claims, 
privileges, powers and immunities. (Hohfeld, 1923, p. 36) Having a privilege means that one 
is allowed to perform or not perform a certain action. Having a claim means that someone else 
has an obligation to another person to perform or not perform a certain action. Having a 
power indicates that I can change my own or someone else’s claims or privileges. Finally, 
having an immunity means that someone else is not allowed to change certain claims or 
privileges. 
In order to add more transparency to this categorization, Hart uses only two categories 
of rights: primary and secondary rights. With primary rights (claims and privileges) “human 
beings are required to do or abstain from certain actions, whether they wish it or not.” 
Secondary rights (powers and immunities) “are in a sense parasitic upon or secondary to the 
first; for they provide that human beings may by doing or saying certain things introduce new 
rules of the primary type, extinguish or modify old ones, or in various ways determine their 
incidence or control their operations.” (Hart, 1961, p. 78-79)
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 This distinction between claims, privileges, powers and immunities will become 
crucial later on in this chapter and in the next one, so I will try to clarify it with an example. 
Let’s say that I have a right to life. In the primary dimension, this suggests that I have a claim 
against everyone else that they do not end my life. This claim can be against other individuals 
and against the government. In the primary dimension, I also have an immunity against my 
neighbor changing this claim. He can not suddenly choose to remove my claim that I am no to 
be killed. However, a judge for instance may have power over my claim. If I live in a country 
where the death penalty is allowed, a judge may decide to extinguish my right to life by 
sentencing me to death. I am not arguing that it is necessarily good that a judge can do this 
(opponents of the death penalty obviously oppose the judge’s power-right over my claim-right 
to life), yet the judge has the power anyhow.
This raises a new question: where do rights actually come from? Legally speaking, in 
democratic societies rights are usually granted by parliamentary majorities and embedded in 
laws. Yet what is the reason for us to create and grant things like rights?
Granting rights is meant to settle disputes of how to act in advance. If I am planning to 
kill my neighbor because I just don’t like him, I might stop to think about my action for a 
moment. I might weigh the positive and negative consequences for myself and (if I am 
empathetic) for my neighbor. If I were to decide that the positive consequences for me 
(getting rid of my annoying neighbor) outweigh the negative consequences for my neighbor 
(death), I would probably go next door and kill him. However in the act of weighing the pros 
and cons, rights will enter the balance. If someone were to convince me that everyone (or at 
least my neighbor) has a right to life, I might reconsider my actions. In general, rights are a 
guideline of how to act morally, giving weight to certain values that we hold dear, such as life, 
free speech or privacy.
How do we decide whether we have a moral right to something? There are two major 
ways to make such a decision. One is consequentialist and is called an instrumental theory of 
rights; the other one is deontological and is called the status theory of rights. (Wenar, 2005) I 
would argue that something can be said for both ways, and I will discuss them now.
Consequentialism judges actions solely on the value of their consequences. The most 
influential consequentialist theory, utilitarianism, sees an action as moral if it increases (or 
maximizes) overall welfare or happiness for as many persons as possible. Obviously, this 
seems to be in conflict with the concept of rights: if we see rights as rules that we should 
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follow when we act, these rules limit the options that we have. One of the options that is 
restricted because of a particular right might be the one that produces the best consequences. 
Consequentialism wants to judge every action on the consequences of that specific action, on 
a case-by-case basis. This, however, leaves no room for rights, that can restrict us to make the 
choice with the best consequences. Understandably, then, Sumner comes to the conclusion 
that “consequentialist theories have a reputation for hostility to rights.” (Sumner, 1987, p. 
164)
How can consequentialism lead to an instrumental theory of rights? Of course, there 
are a lot of different theories of rights that are based on consequentialism, but what they 
basically have in common is that they see rights as tools to achieve the best consequences. In 
On Liberty, John Stuart Mill uses this argument to defend the freedom of speech: in different 
ways, a right to freedom of speech is vital because it is beneficial to all of mankind. (Mill, 
1859, p. 76-78) This might create problems for a consequentialist: if a right is conflicting with 
a non-right positive consequence, and violating the right has slightly better consequences than 
respecting it, a consequentialist would have to break the right or depart from his 
consequentialism: both are undesirable actions.
Undoubtedly, the consequentialist approach to rights has merits. The reason that 
utilitarianism and consequentialism can “feel” so valid is because consequences matter. When 
we make decisions in real life situations we always tend to consider the consequences. 
Politicians would surely become unpopular if they would have no eye for the consequences of 
their policies. It is pretty difficult, for example, to defend an uneven way of distributing 
wealth because it is just in and of itself, while simultaneously people are dying of hunger. I 
shall return to this later.
Deontological theories judge actions not on their consequences, but on how much 
value these actions have in and of themselves. This specific judgment is usually based on the 
Kantian idea that human beings are not merely means to an end but the end itself. 
Instrumental rights are therefore usually based on something like human dignity. Warren 
Quinn gives a good definition of this, so I will quote him at length here: “A person is 
constituted by his body and mind. They are parts or aspects of him. For that very reason, it is 
fitting that he has primary say over what may be done to them – not because such an 
arrangement best promotes overall human welfare, but because any arrangement that denied 
him that say would be a grave indignity. In giving him this authority, morality recognizes his 
existence as an individual with ends of his own – an independent being.” (Quinn, 1989, p. 
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I personally prefer status-based rights over instrumental rights, since they offer a more 
stable system of rights and therefore a more powerful guide on how to act in accordance with 
these rights. Apart from my personal preference, we should not forget that status-based and 
instrumental rights are not mutually exclusive. We can defend a right both on basis of the 
status approach and on basis of the instrumental approach, and if we can do that, the right 
becomes much stronger. So when we are considering creating a right in our society, the 
optimal situation would be that it is a right that can be defended from both a consequentialist 
and a deontological position. A right to life, for example, can be said to both respect and 
promote human dignity and to have positive consequences for everyone who enjoys the right 
and society as a whole. I would argue that we can defend both a right to privacy and a right to 
security in this way, which I will turn to right now.
2) Why we have a right to privacy
It seems to me that privacy is important for every human being, and we should have a 
right to privacy for both deontological and consequential reasons. I will start with the former.
Privacy can be seen as a status-based right. This approach uses an appeal to human 
dignity to defend privacy, in a similar way that people who defend a right to bodily integrity 
appeal to it. If we view privacy from this position, we can hold that human dignity is 
composed of several elements, one of them being privacy. The most famous defender of this 
approach is Edward Bloustein, who I will quote here at length. “The man who is compelled to 
live every minute of his life among others and whose every need, thought, desire, fancy or 
gratification is subject to public scrutiny, has been deprived of his individuality and human 
dignity. Such an individual merges with the mass. His opinions, being public, tend never to be 
different; his aspirations, being known, tend always to be conventionally accepted ones; his 
feelings, being openly exhibited, tend to lose their quality of unique personal warmth and to 
become the feelings of every man. Such a being, although sentient, is fungible; he is not an 
individual.” (Bloustein, 1964, p.1003) 
This view looks a lot like the argument Quinn used to defend status-based rights, and 
what he said about them can also be applied to privacy. This approach to privacy as a right 
appeals to the individuality and uniqueness of human beings. By accepting that every human 
being is a unique individual, we grant him a certain right to be different from the mass, to be 
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an individual with qualities that are his own. 
If we were to completely dissect the mind of a human being, and learn of all his hopes, 
dreams, fears and secrets and make them public, he would lose his dignity because we would 
not be viewing him as a human being but merely as the sum of his qualities. If he has qualities 
that deviate from the public norms and are now made public, he will feel shame, and he will 
feel forced to change his qualities, therefore changing his individuality. So by acknowledging 
that persons have a mental area where nobody may trespass, we are actually acknowledging 
that even though the individual may not be perfect, the dignity that he has as a human being 
allows him to be, to a certain degree, imperfect, and without public scrutiny threatening that 
imperfection.
From the consequentialist approach, we will look at privacy as an instrumental right. 
In this sense, a guaranteed right to privacy is desirable because it promotes freedom. 
Obviously, this is not the place to engage in the debate about whether freedom is good or bad, 
I will just state that having more freedom is a positive consequence. This is in line with the 
consequentialist idea that we should be able to choose the actions that have the most positive 
consequences for ourselves or for society. The more freedom we have, the more options we 
have. The more options we have, the bigger the chance is that we can choose an option with 
positive consequences. I would suggest that a guaranteed right to privacy promotes freedom 
in two ways.
First of all, when privacy is decreased, freedom is decreased as well because someone 
else (another individual, or the state) gains power over you. For example, when someone 
obtains a certain piece of sensitive information that you would not want anyone to know, he 
can use this information by threatening with publication of the information, unless you do as 
he pleases, which means your freedom is limited. 
Another example is that by gaining information about the individual, the relation of 
power between the individual and the one that obtained the information changes. (Parent, 
1983, p.276) When someone else learns of your fear of spiders, he may use spiders to deter 
your from entering a building he does not want you to enter. For that reason alone, one might 
want to hide one’s fear of spiders from others. This kind of shift in the power relations 
between two actors becomes especially relevant when large companies violate privacy: they 
can use private information about you to make you more incline to buy their products, even 
though you may not have wanted to buy them in the first place. Consequentially, your 
freedom to choose the product that you might have wanted is reduced.
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Secondly, a decrease of privacy can be problematic for those behaving in a way that 
might not be illegal, but is frowned upon by society. A lot of societies are intolerant of certain 
lifestyles, and public shame will be brought upon those that live by these lifestyles. For 
example, in most countries, homosexuality is not illegal, but we can very well understand why 
homosexuals might want to hide their sexual preferences: because it is not mainstream and 
still frowned upon by a lot of people. By guaranteeing privacy, we give them the freedom to 
live their lives as they want to, without being criticized by others. This argument makes it 
clear why we definitely should protect privacy as a right, and should not let a democratic 
society decide what is private and what is not on a case-by-case basis. For the majority of the 
people may not be ashamed of the things that a minority might be deeply ashamed of. When 
people argue that they do not object to a certain privacy-violating measure by the government 
because they have nothing to hide, this is due to the fact that how they behave is probably 
accepted by society. A person who is the perfect model for how society would want someone 
to be, might possibly not care about privacy at all (and may even want to expose himself as 
much as possible). However, privacy is not there to protect them; it is to protect those that do 
things that may not be illegal, but are not accepted by everyone. By creating this possibility 
we are creating freedom for people with deviating lifestyles.
Gavison names two other positive consequences of privacy that are not necessarily 
related to freedom: mental health and human relations. Enjoying privacy promotes mental 
health, since “individuals may become victims of mental illness because of pressures to 
conform to society’s expectations. Strict obedience to all social standards is said inevitably to 
lead to inhibition, repression, alienation, symptoms of disease, and possible mental 
breakdown.” (Gavison, 1980, p. 448) 
Although the evidence that Gavison gives in favor of this argument is rather weak 
(especially the word “inevitably” would need a lot more proof), we can imagine that a certain 
barrier between society’s standards and one self is desirable to increase mental health. A lack 
of privacy means that society has more possibilities to check whether an individual is 
conforming to specific societal standards or not. If society learns that this is not the case, 
pressure may be applied in order to make the individual conform to the societal standards, 
which eventually might lead to mental health problems (or at least to unhappiness, I would 
think). 
Gavison’s second positive consequence of privacy is the promotion of human 
relations. She defends this argument by acknowledging that human relations are only possible 
if we can somehow keep certain pieces of information away from others. In some sense, this 
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argument might be explained as the possibility to lie (whether by omission or not) or to 
behave differently in different environments. For example, people behave differently when 
they are at work than when they are at home. And we can indeed agree that it would not 
improve our relations at work if our colleagues would know everything that is happening in 
our homes, where we are in a different environment and behave accordingly. In this sense, 
privacy enables us to keep different social environments separate. When someone does not 
enjoy privacy, this separation is gone and people will be less capable of engaging in human 
relations. (Gavison, 1980, p. 450)
There are also a lot of negative consequences that specifically apply when the 
government violates the privacy of an individual, and I will shortly discuss four of them here.
Firstly, the government learns a lot more about its citizens than they ever could in the 
past. Through data mining and data analysis, the government creates profiles of its citizens 
that can tell a lot about our characters and our behavior. (Solove, 2008, p. 357-358) Generally, 
we have no opportunity to see our own profiles to check whether they are accurate or not, 
giving citizens no opportunity to correct possible errors in such profiles. And although it 
depends on how much we can trust our government, it is always advisable to be on our guard 
against governments knowing too much about our behavior (or anyone with that much power 
over us, for that matter).
Secondly, even though we may trust the government as a whole with our information, 
‘the government’ is merely an abstraction. It consists of a lot of public servants, and although 
we can generally trust them with sensitive information, we should not forget that they are not 
“wise, self-restrained angels”. (Shue, 2005, p. 235) 
Thirdly, government is usually run by some of the parties that we have in a democracy, 
implying that there are some parties that might have access to a lot of sensitive information 
about all citizens. Through profiling, they can gain a better understanding of how people think 
and behave, possibly giving them an edge over the other parties in elections.
Finally, the government is storing data until they have a need for it, or until it has been 
analyzed. As long as it is stored, the information might leak. As we all know, data leaks by 
governments happen all too often, while failing to protect data containing citizen’s private 
information is also a definite violation of privacy.
I have provided a number of positive consequences that a right to privacy has for 
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individuals, and I have tried to explain why we have a right to privacy from a deontological 
point of view. However, if we want to have a right to privacy that is somehow protected in a 
legal way, there has to be a certain universality to what we should call privacy and what not. 
Up until now, I have regarded privacy simply as “information about oneself”. And although I 
think this is the correct definition and all the information about oneself falls under the concept 
of privacy, I do not think it is realistic that all the information about oneself should be 
protected by a right to privacy. We have to somehow narrow this concept down by answering 
the following question: which information is private, and which information isn’t?
Clearly, it is difficult to answer this question. Overall, what we consider as ‘private’ is 
different for every individual. For example, I do not want anyone to know which websites I 
have visited during the last month. I would surely want to have this list of websites protected 
by the right to privacy that I have. Contrastingly, someone else may not care about someone 
else knowing about his internet activity at all, and have other pieces of information that he 
would prefer to see protected. So it seems that something can be considered to be private 
when a particular individual himself feels that it is.
Indeed, this brings about all sorts of trouble. In general, rights need to have a certain 
universality, especially if we are going to embed them in laws. If we would let everyone 
decide what pieces of private information they would want protected, we would possibly have 
all kinds of weird obligations. If a friend for some reason would invoke his right to privacy to 
prevent me from looking at him while he is walking on the street, that just feels awkward. So 
what people believe to be private is relevant, but we don’t want every person to decide 
individually what kind of information he has a right to privacy for.
Maybe we should let society decide in a democratic way, which is something we do 
with a lot of issues. We could hold a referendum where voters can decide for a lot of types of 
information whether they regard them to be private or not. Types of information that are 
believed to be private by a majority of the people will fall under the right to privacy. Although 
this sounds fairly reasonable, it does create problems. Some kinds of information that we 
might want to protect with a right to privacy are not considered as private by most people 
because they conform to the norms of society. But a right to privacy is not to protect those 
people, it is to protect those who do not necessarily conform to the norms of society. 
For example, let’s say that a random Western government would want to register 
everyone’s political views. The majority of people have moderate views that are accepted by 
society since there is a majority that holds these views. The majority members would not have 
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a problem with this register, because they don’t feel that their right to privacy should include 
something that, for them, is not embarrassing at all. Of course, the people that have extreme 
political views might not want these views to be known to anyone else, but they will lose the 
referendum that decides whether ‘having a political view’ should fall under the right to 
privacy. Evidently, people that truly have “nothing to hide” could still understand those that 
do, and might be empathic to the latter’s desire to have protection of embarrassing 
information. For instance, the rights that minorities have obtained in the last decades show 
that minorities can expect this sort of empathy. Defining what is private and what not, should 
occur through democratic debate, and the burden of proof lies with those who believe that a 
certain piece of information should explicitly not fall under the right to privacy.
In the end, it remains complicated to think of a specific mechanism to decide what sort 
of information should be considered private and protected under the right to privacy. Making 
an objective list is hard because of the many differences between societies and because norms 
and taboos are constantly changing. Yet I think a list of things to be considered private should 
definitely include those things that a significant minority believes to be private.
At the beginning of this chapter, I discussed the categorization of rights by Hohfeld 
and Hart, which will now be applied to the right to privacy. It seems to me that we have a 
right to privacy against other citizens, but of course this thesis is about the right to privacy 
that an individual has against the government. The right to privacy is a primary claim-right, 
which implicates that the individual has a claim against the government having certain kinds 
of private information about this individual. This issue will be discussed in the next chapter, 
but first I will shortly argue why we actually have a right to security.
3) Why we have a right to security
In the previous chapter it has been explained what security is. We found it consists of 
physical integrity and property protection, with a feeling of security also being relevant. 
Similar to the right to privacy, we can defend a right to security both as a status-based right 
and as an instrumental right. I will not give much attention to defending the right the security 
in these ways, because a right to security basically has prima facie strength and is accepted by 
virtually everyone. It is also less complex than the right to privacy, which makes accepting it 
much easier.
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A right to security can be defended on a deontological basis in the same way as 
privacy: human beings own their body and mind, and nobody else may own it. We therefore 
have a right that others may not violate, because a violation would mean to deny that we are 
the ones that are the master of our own body and mind. For this reason, violating physical 
integrity for whatever reason makes our body the means to an end, while human beings 
should be an end in themselves.
Defending a right to security on a consequentialist basis is relatively easy: we can 
contend that physically hurting someone does not only cause a lot of pain and grief (which are 
things a consequentialist, especially a utilitarian one, will want to avoid), but also emotional 
and psychological damage. For a utilitarian like John Stuart Mill, preventing harm is the most 
important task of governments. A right to security defends our bodies against violence and 
therefore prevents harm, making it a desirable right for a consequentialist. 
Essentially, property rights are more complex, and sometimes disputed. The 
philosophical sub-field of distributive justice concerns itself with these rights, and how we 
should treat them. (Waldron, 2004) However, it is generally accepted that someone can own 
property, making him the one that can do with the property what he wants within the limits of 
the law. Obviously, this thesis is not the place to summarize the entire discussion that 
surrounds property rights, so I will just assume that we can own property and that property 
rights are a part of a right to security.
While we do have a right to security (being physical integrity and property 
ownership), we do not have a right to a feeling of security. Of course, once our right to 
security is respected, we will probably start feeling safe as well. As such, individuals do not 
have a claim against the government or other individuals that they should feel safe. A feeling 
of safety comes from individuals themselves, and if someone feels unsafe without any reason, 
he is the one to blame, and no one else. The reason that I am dealing with this issue is because 
in discussions about privacy and security, often the argument that people should be able to 
feel safe is used to defend privacy violating policies. 
Let me now turn back to the categorization of rights. The right to security is a primary 
claim-right against other individuals and the government: a claim that they do not hurt us and 
do not steal or destroy our private property. Nevertheless, this thesis is specifically about the 
government protecting us from violence and theft by other individuals. So the government 
should respect our right to security, but that is not what this thesis is about: it concentrates on 
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the primary claim-right of security that we have against other individuals.
IV. WHEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY CONFLICT
When privacy and security are compared, authors usually use the metaphor of finding a 
balance between the two. This suggests that the image that the government is operating a 
weighing scale that has to be balanced. In this context, let us assume that the weighing scale is 
in perfect balance, but because of external factors, such as an increased threat of terrorism 
after September 11, it is suddenly imbalanced. Thus, the metaphor of balance would lead us to 
the most obvious action: decreasing some of our privacy so we regain some security, by 
which the scales are in balance again. (Etzioni, 1999, p. 184)
This chapter will address the issue of balance, and whether the above method of 
rebalancing scales is actually the appropriate way to cope with changing external factors. 
After some deliberation I will come to the conclusion that using the image of balance is an 
interesting way of looking at prioritizing rights, but that there are many problems with it, 
especially if one jumps to conclusions in the way that Amitai Etzioni does in the previous 
paragraph.
I will start with an elaboration of how we should deal with rights: whether they are 
absolute, and what happens when they are indeed violated. This will indicate that we probably 
do have to balance the two rights out against each other. Then I shall give an analysis of how 
balancing actually works in the work of certain authors, and explore whether there are faults 
in the methods that have led them to arrive at very different conclusions about reality, even 
though it seems their methods are practically the same. I will end with an argument of how 
balancing should function if we truly care for the right to privacy and the right to security.
1) How should we treat rights?
It is one thing to say that someone has a right, but that still does not tell us how we 
should deal with these rights in everyday situations. People may choose to voluntarily 
abandon one of their own rights, and conflicts of rights occur all the time. So I will now 
address these issues by exploring how we should treat rights in certain situations.
Firstly, I am aware that people may voluntarily abandon or ignore their own rights. To 
have a right to something means that others should respect this right, not that we ourselves are 
absolutely required to uphold it. This is especially relevant in the case of the right to privacy, I 
think, because people decide to share private information all the time. This still counts as a 
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reduction of one’s privacy, but there seems to be nothing wrong with it. Notwithstanding, 
when I decide to tell a secret to a close friend with the specific instruction that he should not 
tell anyone else, he is violating my right to privacy when he passes the secret on to others. 
Secondly, there exists the idea of rights being absolute. This is an idea which is based 
on Kant, implying that there are rights that may never be violated, no matter how bad the 
consequences are, and no matter which other claims we may have that would mean the right 
has to be violated. I do not think this is true, and it also makes no sense. Like I said earlier 
while discussing deontological ethics, at some point the stakes will just be too high to not 
violate the right. As Gavison notes: “It does not mean that privacy is the one value we seek to 
promote, or even the most important among a number of values to which we are committed. 
This is true for all our values, however. None is protected absolutely, not even those to which 
a commitment is made in unequivocal terms in the Constitution.” (Gavison, 1980, p. 468)
Raise the stakes enough and even a quintessential right will be overruled by other 
rights or by security rights of others. If we have to kill someone in order to save a thousand 
others, it may become tempting to violate the right to life of this one particular individual, 
especially if this individual was someone that we would consider to be “bad” (i.e. a terrorist 
or criminal). 
Additionally, there is the matter of efficiency. If we would suggest, for example, that 
security always trumps privacy, this could produce undesirable results, and massive privacy 
right violations. Let us assume we live in a hypothetical Western society that is rather 
peaceful, and consists without violations of privacy and other liberties occurring too much 
there is only one murder a year in the entire country. If we would follow the argument that 
security always trumps privacy, we should turn this peaceful society into a police state in 
order to also prevent this one murder a year. This is way too rigorous. Most people will agree 
that one dead person a year is an acceptable price to pay for liberty for the entire country.
Thirdly, what should we do when a right is indeed violated? I have just argued that 
rights are not absolute, which means they are sometimes justifiably violated in order to 
promote a certain good or other right. When we make the consideration that right A (of any 
given person) outweighs right B (of the same or another person), one will have to violate right 
B. To be sure, that does not mean that the owner of right B has lost his right. The right is still 
there, even though it has been violated. Judith Thomson suggests that the term “violated” 
should be replaced by “defeated”, indicating that the right still exists but has been overruled in 
27
this particular case (which also means that in the future, in a different case, right B might 
defeat another right C). When a right is defeated, Thomson continues, it leaves behind a 
“moral residue”, which means that the person that violated the right has obligations towards 
the owner of the right. For instance, we could think of an apology, or some way to 
compensate the damage that has been done. (Thomson, 1990, p. 84-86) This makes sense. The 
government also does this when it has wrongfully imprisoned someone: these persons usually 
get a sum of money as compensation, or at the very least an apology. Michael Walzer has 
phrased this argument in a rather effective way: “When rules are overridden, we do not talk or 
act as if they had been set aside, canceled or annulled. They still stand and have this much 
effect at least: that we know we have done something wrong even if what we have done was 
also the best thing to do on the whole in the circumstances.” (Walzer, 1973, p. 171) In the case 
of privacy violation by the government in order to increase security, this solution seems 
highly impractical. The government would have to apologize or pay money to everyone to 
compensate for the privacy violations, since nowadays almost everyone is being filmed by 
security cameras every now and then. I think that all the good things that our government does 
for us may compensate this, but we should not forget about the moral residue, and we 
definitely should not overlook that a right has been violated.
2) Should we balance privacy and security?
If we accept that absolute rights do not exist and privacy and security are not trump 
rights that always defeat the other one, we must also accept that we sometimes have to violate 
one right in order to promote the other. Eventually, it seems like we will have to find some 
way to balance privacy and security.
Such ways have been suggested before. There are many examples of practical 
frameworks that can be applied to privacy-related legislation to determine whether a violation 
of the right to privacy is acceptable, and I shall discuss two prominent ones in the next part of 
this chapter. 
Let me start with the image of balance. This image depicts the idea that two “things” 
are at odds with each other and we have to find an acceptable middle ground in which there is 
an acceptable amount of both “things” present. In this case, as Jeremy Waldron correctly 
describes, it concerns finding a balance between an individual’s privacy and society’s need for 
protection against harm. In fact, Waldron believes this has the following consequence: “There 
is always a balance to be struck. And that balance is bound to change (and it is appropriate 
that it should change) as the threat to security becomes graver or more imminent.” (Waldron, 
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2003, p. 192)
Waldron formulates criticism of the image of balancing privacy and security, but most 
of it is about how the process of balancing is occurring instead of about the concept of 
balancing itself. I will return to Waldron’s critique on balance later in this chapter, and will 
give two objections that I have against the image of balance. 
 
First of all, the image of balance gives us the idea that there are two relevant concepts 
(in this case, a right to privacy and a right to security) that should be weighed against each 
other. This does not mean that they are the same, or have the same weight, but merely that 
they can be compared. Just like we can compare the weight of an apple with the weight of 
pocket watch, we can also compare a right to privacy and a right to security. In principle, the 
image of balance suggests that they are comparable to each other, while this may not 
necessarily be the case. Although they are both rights, they seem to be too different to be 
weighed against each other. The image of balance suggests a certain equality between the two 
rights that can be doubted. I will come back to this issue later in this chapter, but for now it is 
sufficient to note that the image of balance suggests that privacy and security are mutually 
comparable and lie on the same scale, which I believe they are not.
Secondly, based on plausible objections by Lucia Zedner, balancing is often presented 
as a zero-sum game, “in which more of one necessarily means less of the other.” (Zedner, 
2005, p. 511) Actually, this is not necessarily the case. Before our governments had advanced 
methods of surveillance they were also capable of granting us a certain amount of security 
without invading our privacy as much as they do now. And it is not hard to think of a 
government policy that has reduced our privacy without increasing our security. Though in a 
lot of cases it may be true that more of one does mean less of the other, it is not an absolute 
necessity, something that the image of balance suggests. Our priority should not lie with 
finding a situation where we have an acceptable amount of privacy and security, but where we 
have an optimal amount of privacy and security.
The semantics of balance are relevant here because, as Waldron noted correctly, 
balance seems to imply that we have to rebalance once things change, which is certainly not 
always true. So let me propose a term that does not have these implications: the desirable 
situation in a society is a privacy-security equilibrium. Now I shall turn to what such a 
situation should look like.
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3) How can we find the privacy-security equilibrium?
Several authors have given frameworks for balancing privacy and security. I will 
discuss two important frameworks: one by Alan Westin, who argues for more privacy, and one 
by Amitai Etzioni, who argues for less privacy. The interesting issue here is that their 
frameworks have a lot in common but they reach very different conclusions about how the 
status quo should be changed (which can only partially be explained by the gap of 32 years 
between their books). I will first discuss both frameworks and argue that both of them lack an 
essential element, and I will conclude this part of the chapter by explaining how we should 
reach an acceptable privacy-security equilibrium.
Westin presents five steps that we should follow when balancing, so privacy can 
“receive its proper weight on the scales in any process of balancing competing values”:
1. Measuring the seriousness of the need to conduct surveillance.
2. Deciding whether there are alternative methods.
3. Deciding the reliability of the instrument.
4. Determining whether consent to surveillance has been given.
5. Measuring the capacity for limitation and control of the surveillance if it is allowed.
According to Westin, if there is a serious need, there are no alternative methods, the privacy-
violating instrument is reliable, there is consent, and the instrument can be controlled, 
surveillance is allowed. (Westin, 1967, p. 370-377) I would argue that 1, 2, 3 and 5 are all 
valid steps, and that they should definitely be applied when the government is proposing a 
policy that might possibly violate privacy. However, they are also quite obvious steps. If there 
is no serious need (step 1) privacy obviously does not have to be violated to fight a threat 
(although this seems happens often enough).
Westin’s fourth step, about consent to privacy violation, is interesting though. The 
issue about privacy violation is that it cannot rely on consent. When people can individually 
choose whether they do or do not wish to be the subject of a policy that violates privacy, those 
who the policy is meant for (the people that are planning on breaking the law) will usually not 
give their consent, along with a lot of people who won’t break the law but don’t want to be 
observed. This means that the ones that have to be observed in order to increase security are 
exactly the ones who probably will not want to be observed. To be sure, we could get consent 
through democratic procedures like we usually do, but that still will not work. If we would let 
citizens vote in a referendum to decide whether a certain policy that violates privacy should 
be passed, a majority will most probably vote in favor of it. The reason is that it is usually a 
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minority that does have something to hide, even though that ‘something’ is not illegal, but 
merely something to be more or less ashamed of. So step 4 seems a bit off, but the other steps 
are all necessary requirements before we are allowed to implement a policy that violates 
privacy.
Communitarian philosopher Etzioni has a comparable framework of four rules that we 
should follow if we want to violate privacy of individuals:
1. There should be a well-documented and macroscopic threat.
2. If possible, the government should first resort to measures that do not violate privacy.
3. The privacy-restricting measures should be as minimally intrusive as possible.
4. Undesirable side effects should be treated.
Through this framework, he reaches the conclusion that in a lot of cases, there is too much 
concern for privacy and not enough concern for the public good (usually something security-
related). (Etzioni, 1999, p. 10-15) Personally, I tend to agree with these rules, but just like 
with Westin’s steps, these four rules are basically quite obvious. These sets of steps and rules 
don’t tell us how we should treat privacy and security when they are at odds, neither do they 
provide us with any reliable tools by which to come to an equilibrium. That explains why both 
authors come to very different conclusions about the desirability of something like camera 
surveillance, even though their general frameworks are comparable and not mutually 
exclusive.
Then how should we do it? Terms like ‘balance’ and ‘equilibrium’ suggest that we can 
have some sort of quantitative analysis of privacy and security. It suggests that when the 
government is planning to place surveillance cameras with microphones in a crowded 
shopping street, we can calculate that society will gain 20 points of security but lose 25 points 
of privacy. This is unrealistic, because we cannot quantify abstract concepts like privacy and 
security. And even if we could, it would probably be of no use: when the government is 
considering measures that violate privacy they are always dealing with hypotheticals. We 
cannot know for sure if the measure will indeed reduce violence. Surveillance cameras may 
work as a deterrent for criminals, who may decide to not commit a crime at all. However, it 
may also lead them to simply commit their crime in another area, where there is no electronic 
surveillance. And, in extreme cases such as terrorism, surveillance cameras will most likely 
do nothing to prevent a suicide bombing anyway.
For the sake of the argument, let us now assume that we can quantify privacy and 
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security, and let’s assume we can know the consequences for both if a certain government 
policy is successfully implemented. Even in this case, frameworks such as those of Westin 
and Etzioni will not give us the answers we are looking for. For instance, there is a certain 
street in a particular city in a certain Western democracy where there is a moderate amount of 
crime. The government is facing three options: placing surveillance cameras (policy A), 
placing surveillance cameras with microphones (policy B) or doing nothing (policy C). Some 
very smart government employees have quantified the expected consequences to privacy and 
security for society, and have come up with the following figure:
Policy A Policy B Policy C
Privacy 95 90 100
Security 110 115 100
So, which option should be chosen? If we value privacy most, we would choose Policy 
C. If we value security most, we would go for Policy B. And if we are neutral towards the 
two, we would prefer Policy A, which gives the highest combined amount of privacy and 
security. The crucial question is, then: which one do we have to choose? Eventually, Westin, 
Etzioni and other ‘balance promoters’ do not provide us with an acceptable answer to this 
question. In the final two sections of this chapter, I will make an attempt to truly compare 
privacy and security.
4) How do we truly compare privacy and security?
There are two ways by which we can now proceed. The first one is that of pure 
consequentialism, in which we compare privacy and security solely based on their respective 
positive or negative consequences. The second strategy is that of comparing the right to 
privacy with the right to security, to find out whether they are the same kind of rights or not. I 
think the consequentialist approach is not suitable for the task of comparing privacy and 
security, so I will start by discussing that one.
The consequentialist approach only looks at the consequences of policy to determine 
whether it is acceptable or not. When comparing a right to privacy and a right to security, a 
consequentialist would only evaluate the outcome of the policy for the individuals involved. It 
usually does so in a strictly utilitarian way, with human welfare as the preferred way of 
measuring outcomes. Naturally, what the consequences are and how they are appreciated 
depends on a lot of factors: the status quo, the proposed policy, the preferences of the 
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individuals involved, and a lot of other elements. But let us try to look at privacy and security 
as objectively as possible. In the first chapter I have already given the positive consequences 
of privacy and security. Let us now compare them in a consequentialist way.
The point that immediately comes to mind is that a majority of people would probably 
value security more than privacy. This follows from the impressions that we get from the 
usual real life discussions on privacy and security: that it’s not so bad that you are constantly 
being filmed by a surveillance camera if that means that your potential murderer is deterred 
by it and you will not be murdered. As noted before, though, this is a flawed comparison. We 
can safely assume that being murdered is the most extreme violation of your right to security 
imaginable; being filmed by one security camera is hardly the most extensive violation of 
your privacy. If you wish to objectively compare privacy and security you would have to 
compare being killed to something else, like being stripped bare and being displayed on a 
large public square so everyone could see you, while a loudspeaker is announcing your 
darkest secrets.
When we assess the consequences as listed in chapter one, we can see that privacy and 
security have a lot in common: both increase liberty in one way or another. If I enjoy security, 
I am able to do what I want to do without being murdered, robbed or beaten by the 
government or someone else. When I enjoy privacy something similar happens: when I am 
not under scrutiny I have more freedom to think as I want to think and act as I want to act. 
Enjoying privacy allows me to develop my individual self as I see fit, and that is definitely 
freedom. The difference between privacy and security is that privacy is primarily beneficial 
for psychological freedom, while security is primarily beneficial for physical freedom. They 
are both necessary conditions without which living a happy life is not possible. We are not 
able to determine whether security has more value than privacy or vice versa, because they 
are in many ways closely related to each other. Whether an individual prefers one over the 
other depends on his personality, his experiences and his preferences. The consequentialist 
approach for comparing privacy and security thus fails to give a satisfactory answer to our 
question.
So we have to look for our answer in a more deontological way. When distinguishing 
between different kinds of liberties, the difference between negative and positive liberty as 
defended by Isaiah Berlin is the most promising one. Berlin defines negative liberty as not 
being prevented by others from doing what you could otherwise do, and positive liberty as 
actually being able to do what you want to do. (Berlin, 1969, p. 122 & 131-132) In that sense, 
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both privacy and security are forms of negative liberty. They do not provide you with the 
opportunity to do something you otherwise couldn’t have done, but merely ensure that others 
don’t interfere with the things you could already do. In this sense, privacy and security are 
also more or less the same.
It is at this point that a very important distinction comes along. This idea, most notably 
defended by Quinn, deals with two different kinds of agency: action and inaction. (Quinn, 
1989, p. 291) Quinn uses the terms active and passive for these types of agency, but in order 
to avoid confusion with Berlin’s distinction of liberty I will use the terms active and passive. 
Active agency is doing something, passive agency is not doing something. The distinction 
between active and passive agency would be “the distinction between harm occurring because 
of what the agent does (because of the existence of one of his actions), and harm occurring 
because of what the agent did not do but might have done (because of the noninstantiation of 
some kind of action that he might have performed). (Quinn, 1989, p. 294) This argument is 
obviously deontological, because a consequentialist would not care between actions and 
inactions, but would only assess the consequences of the decision to act or not to act. 
Quinn uses a strong prima facie argument in which he argues that passive agency feels 
different than active agency. I tend to agree with this. Killing a person by drowning him, or 
doing nothing while a person drowns, is both morally wrong. It violates the particular 
individual’s right to life. However, the difference is significant. When I drown a person 
myself, I am actively causing him to die. Without my action, he would not have died. When I 
do not act while a person drowns, he dies without any involvement from me. If for some 
reason I would not have been there, he still would have drowned, because his drowning was 
caused by other factors than myself. This is not the case when I am actively involved in 
drowning him. Of course, it is still morally wrong to do nothing, and if we have to make the 
decision we should obviously come to the rescue of the drowning person. (Quinn, 1989, p. 
302-305) 
In general, especially democratic governments are susceptible to this kind of reasoning 
because of their responsibility to their citizens. In democracies, the government has 
legitimacy because individuals have given it to them through elections. And although I do not 
wish to get into consent theory, it should be noted that the power that a government wields is 
derived from the consent of the majority of its citizens. The government is to be held 
accountable for its actions and inactions by the electorate because the decisions that the 
government makes affect reality. 
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If we were to return to the natural state (whether it is Hobbesian or Lockean does not 
matter here), there is a certain situation that apparently needs to be changed (otherwise, there 
would be no need for a government). Because the government deliberately chooses every 
policy it enacts, it is responsible for the consequences of these policies for the lives of human 
beings. 
However, the government is not to the same extent responsible for everything that 
happens that they could have prevented. It is not the United States government that is fully 
responsible for what happened on September 11, but the terrorists who planned and executed 
the attack. And although we may hold the government responsible for not preventing 
something that was caused by third parties, they are less responsible than they would have 
been had it been the result of a deliberate policy that they enacted. To take the September 11 
example even further, it is quite easy to understand that American citizens would have been 
much angrier with their government if George Bush had ordered government employees to 
crash four planes in New York, Washington and Pittsburgh. The obvious reason for this is that 
generally we acknowledge that there is a fundamental difference between an act and an 
omission, especially when the consequences of that omission could not be foreseen.
Thus, what does it mean when we are facing a moral dilemma where we have to 
choose between violating one of two rights, one of them requiring active agency and the other 
one requiring passive agency? It definitely does not imply that the option that requires 
negative agency always overrules the other. It does mean that the right requiring active agency 
is more easily defeated than the right requiring passive agency: “The basic thing is not that 
killing is intrinsically worse than letting die, or more generally that harming is worse than 
failing to save from harm, but that these different choices run up against different kinds of 
right – one of which is stronger than the other in the sense that it is less easily defeated.” 
(Quinn, 1989, p. 289) Quinn is suggesting that ceteris paribus, when one can choose to 
violate right A by doing nothing or to violate right B by acting, we should always choose to do 
nothing.
And this is where we can start to see a huge difference between a right to privacy and 
a right to security. Of course, we can see both of these rights in a passive and active way. A 
negative right to privacy would indicate that nobody is eavesdropping on my private 
conversation (requiring an inaction), while a positive right to privacy would mean that 
someone (probably the government) would act to prevent someone else from eavesdropping 
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on my private conversation (requiring an action). The same goes for security: a negative right 
to security would mean that nobody is killing me (requiring an inaction), and a positive right 
to privacy would require that someone constrains another actor from killing me (requiring an 
action). 
As we have established before, our discussion is about the government considering a 
policy that violates privacy in order to provide security to its citizens. This means that, 
although both privacy and security are negative liberties, we are now specifically discussing 
the dilemma between fulfilling a right to privacy through inaction, or fulfilling a right to 
security through action. If the government decides to do nothing, it is fulfilling a passive right 
to privacy (by not restricting it), but simultaneously neglecting an active right to security (by 
not preventing harm) through inaction. If the government decides to take the proposed 
measure, it is indeed fulfilling an active right to security (by preventing harm), but violating a 
passive right to privacy (by restricting it) through action.
The exact wording I use here is important. In both scenarios, one right is fulfilled. 
However, in the case of government inaction, the other right is ‘neglected’, while in the case 
of government action, the other right is ‘violated’.
All in all, this leads us to two important conclusions for our comparison between 
privacy and security. Firstly, when the government wants to restrict privacy in order to protect 
security, the burden of proof that the privacy violation is justifiable lies with the government. 
This seems rather obvious to me, but in the public discourse the burden of proof is all too 
often placed with the people who refuse to have their right to privacy violated.
Secondly, it must be noted that when the government has to decide if they want to take 
a certain privacy-violating measure, it should ceteris paribus prioritize protecting privacy 
above protecting security. This is because the government is fully responsible for every 
privacy violation that is a result of the policy, but only partially responsible for every security 
violation that is a result of not implementing the measures. 
Other things being equal, not violating the rights of citizens is more urgent than 
preventing the violation of their rights by other citizens. Logically, this does not indicate that 
privacy is always more important than security (remember that privacy is also not a trump 
card and we should take efficiency into account). In our hypothetical example of the decision 
to put security cameras in the street mentioned on pages 30 and 31, where we have quantified 
everything and have certainty of the outcomes, privacy is more important than security. So to 
come back to that example, if we want to reach an optimal equilibrium between privacy and 
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security, we will have to choose option C: government inaction. 
5) How to make the privacy-security calculus
Of course, the example of policy options A, B and C was unrealistic. It is impossible 
to quantify rights like privacy and security in this way. But since we cannot do this in real life 
policy dilemmas, we do need to look at some form of calculus. This raises the following 
question: which factors should have weight in the decision?
First of all, and most significantly, quantities matter. If we take one of the many ethical 
dilemmas (for example, where we have to torture individual A so he can tell us the location of 
a ticking time bomb hidden somewhere in a large city), we can see that they do. The higher 
you raise the stakes, the more justifiable it becomes to violate an individual right. And 
although Henry Shue warns us of these hypothetical dilemmas because they are often too 
good to be true, we should definitely take into account how many individuals are affected by 
the decision that we make. (Shue, 2005, p. 231) Moreover, the sort of violation is also 
relevant. Judith Thomson illustrates this very effectively: “We have an intuitive notion of the 
strictness or, as I will say, the stringency of a claim.” (Thomson, 1990, p. 153) She gives a 
fine example of two scenarios: one in which I have to kill A to save four people, and one in 
which I have to kick A in the shin to save four people. In both cases, if I choose to save the 
four people, A’s right to security is definitely violated, but it is definitely violated more when I 
kill him than when I would kick him in the shin. So we could say that there should be a 
greater benefit (i.e. more people being saved) for me to be justified to kill someone than there 
would be for me to be justified to kick someone in the shin. Thomson: “In short, the size of 
the required increment of good seems to vary with the stringency of the claim: the more 
stringent the claim, the greater the required increment of good.” (Thomson, 1990, p. 153) 
Where precisely lies the breaking point where we can decide that the violation is 
justified or not? Thomson asks herself the same question, and answers it in the following way: 
“The answer is that there is no answer. There is no one size such that for any claim you 
choose, the claim is permissibly infringeable if and only if infringing it would generate an 
increment of good of that size.” (Thomson, 1990, p. 153) So we can not point at some exact 
amount of lives that should be saved, for example, by a certain privacy-violating measure 
which has been taken. In practice, there are so many other factors weighing in when we have 
to make such a highly complex moral choice between violating privacy and allowing a 
violation of security to occur. Nevertheless, the understanding of how rights work that I have 
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given here definitely helps us understand how we should act when faced with such a 
complicated choice.
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V. PRIVACY AND SECURITY FOR WHOM?
In the previous chapter I have provided a number tools that can be useful when 
comparing privacy and security. Clearly, these tools only apply to the rights of those that are 
involved. When a government has to decide about a policy that might violate privacy, we have 
to answer questions that will definitely affect the outcome of the decision process. The most 
vital one is: “who are involved in the policy?” The question is essential because policy that 
influences privacy and security affects the lives of a lot of individuals. Or, as Lucia Zedner 
puts it: “Given that sectional interests lurk below the surface of any claim to balance 
competing goods, we need in every case to ask not only what but whose interests we are 
weighing.” (Zedner, 2005, p. 314) An analysis of the different groups and individuals that are 
involved goes much further than just counting how much individuals will benefit and how 
much will be disadvantaged. Besides, it cannot be settled by a vague reference to ‘the 
common good’.
In this chapter I will explore the claim that privacy and security are common goods, 
and after that I will look at which relevant actors are involved when privacy and security 
change. 
1) Do privacy and security belong to the common good?
Academic discussions about privacy and security are filled with talk about the 
common good of security and the individual good of privacy. In his book on privacy, Amitai 
Etzioni writes: “A good society seeks a carefully crafted balance between individual rights 
and […] the common good.” (Etzioni, 1999, p. 5) This argumentation suggests that there is a 
fundamental difference in how we should look at privacy, which seems to be for the 
individual, and security, which seems to be for society as a whole. In this first part of chapter 
five, I will argue that this view on privacy and security is misleading and confusing, and that 
both concepts should be treated on an individual basis instead of a societal one.
How should we define the common good? Although there are a lot of definitions 
available for what the common good is, and the subject is not without controversy among 
authors, I will use one that is adequate for my purposes. The common good, I would argue, is 
the good and well-being of a society as a whole. This means that we can think of certain 
actions or decision as beneficial or detrimental for society as a whole, thereby increasing or 
decreasing the common good. For example, we might argue that freedom of speech benefits 
the common good since it will allow our society to be an open one, with a lot of room for 
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democratic debate. 
The common good is often presented as being beneficial to everyone involved. Let us 
look at the example of freedom of speech: we might argue that everyone in our society 
benefits from living in an open society with ample room for democratic debate, and that 
people are content when they can voice their opinion, and unhappy when they are not. In the 
debate about privacy and security, the right to privacy is often displayed as an individual right, 
with security being labelled as part of the common good. Thus, installing security cameras 
will benefit the greater good because it will make our society safer and therefore the common 
good is increased. Refraining from installing security cameras will do just the opposite and 
accordingly will decrease the common good, the argument goes. 
In my view, this argument is wrong for at least two reasons. First of all, if we would 
accept that security is beneficial to the common good, we also have to accept that privacy is 
beneficial to the common good. Privacy allows individuals to have a realm of their own where 
they can escape public scrutiny, which increases their happiness. So a legal right to privacy 
that is not violated by the government generally will also increase the public good.
Secondly, I believe that if we take measures that change the status quo, we should not 
be looking at them as a general increase of the public good. We should be looking at them as 
an increase of a certain good for certain individuals. So if I am a member of a community, and 
we can establish there is a common good, that good should also benefit me. If it doesn’t, it 
either means that I am not a member of that community or that in the end the good is not 
common: we can only call something ‘good’ if it benefits me. If it doesn’t benefit me, it isn’t a 
good for me. It might be a good for my neighbour and for every other inhabitant of the city 
where I live, but if it doesn’t positively affect my own situation it would be wrong to say that I 
just received a good. 
Let us look at a specific example. We might say that having more police officers on 
our streets is beneficial for the common good, because everyone will be safer. I would argue 
that this is not true. We can have a higher expectation of safety, but in the previous chapter it 
was already argued that we do not have a right to a feeling of safety, but only to true security 
through physical integrity and property protection. If the additional police officers have no 
concrete effect at all on my situation it is impossible to claim that I have benefited. Sure, it 
might seem nice that there are more police officers, but if I still get robbed when the police 
officers aren’t looking I have not benefited from any good. In the end, the situation might 
even have become worse for me (for example, because one of the extra police officers is a 
40
rookie and accidentally shoots me while I am jogging). It would be illogical to call this a 
common good. Of course, this doesn’t mean that it’s a bad policy, it just shows that we should 
be extremely careful with the concept of a common good. It is very easy to assume that 
something that we call a common good is good for everyone in a society, while actually it 
only benefits a few. This is especially relevant for the debate on privacy and security. 
In the end, the common good is nothing more than the aggregate of individual goods. 
Indeed, the common good can be said to benefit all of us, but the only actors that we are 
dealing with are individual ones. “Society” is a human construct that is nothing more than a 
group of individuals that have something in common (usually the country in which they live) 
and which is only made up of the individual members. In the same way, a common good is 
nothing more than the aggregate good of these individual members. When we are considering 
policies that affect privacy and security, we should always consider who are involved.
2) Who are involved with privacy and security?
It follows that privacy and security should be treated as goods that affect individuals, 
and not communities or societies. The next question then is: “which individuals?” If the 
government is proposing a law that increases security but decreases privacy, which 
individuals should we take into account while deliberating on the desirability of the particular 
law?
I will start by discussing which people are influenced by a change in security. Let us 
return to our example of a government proposal to install surveillance cameras in the 
hypothetical shopping street with a moderate amount of crime. And let us assume that it is 
proven that for this particular street, the surveillance cameras will lead to a certain reduction 
of crime, because they act as a deterrent for criminals who don’t want to be caught on camera 
while beating up a tourist or stealing a purse. 
We could argue that we have just increased security for everyone who lives in the 
street or passes there, and hence the common good of security has been increased. I disagree 
with this argument. When I am walking through this street at night, and I won’t get robbed or 
molested whether there are surveillance cameras or not, my security has not increased since 
nothing has actually changed for me. The same thing is true when I am going to be robbed or 
molested anyway: when something doesn’t affect me at all, how am I to be considered as a 
relevant actor in the deliberation process for the policy?
We can think of it more schematically in the following way. Let us assume that 
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everyone who passes through our street has an amount of security that we call S1 before the 
surveillance cameras are installed. S1 is not the amount of security you can expect, but the 
actual amount of security that you are going to have when walking down the street. This 
means that someone who will get murdered in the street will have a very low S1, while 
someone who will walk down the street safely will have a very high S1. It also means that we 
can’t really know in advance how much S1 anyone has. The situation changes, however, when 
the surveillance cameras are finally installed. Everyone who now passes the street has S2 
security. When S1 and S2 are the same for an individual, this means that his security has not 
increased and he has not benefited from any good, common or not. So I would argue that for 
us to talk about a good, it should affect our situation in a positive way.
Our expectation of security might increase because we understand there are a number 
of cameras installed and we expect them to deter criminals from robbing or killing us. We 
could say that this increase in expectation of security is a good, because anyone who knows 
about these cameras has an increased feeling of security. However, this is not very significant 
for our discussion about the desirability of surveillance cameras, since this effect will become 
less over time when people learn that these cameras are ineffective. And even if that would 
not be the case, we should still follow Etzioni’s rule that the government should try to find 
alternatives that do not violate privacy, which I think is possible in the case of an expectation 
of security.
What are the consequences for our discussion about the actors involved in increases or 
decreases of security? It means that the argumentation above radically changes the general 
image that we have of these measures. If we only consider the people whose S2 is higher than 
their S1 in our calculus on whether the privacy-violating policy is acceptable or not, there are 
fewer people to consider as beneficiaries to this policy. 
In the context of September 11, this also leads to fundamental changes. In the 
legislation that followed the terrorist attacks, many civil liberties were constrained in the 
name of the public good of security. This was presented as beneficial for every American 
citizen. What if this legislation had been passed before September 11, and would have 
prevented the attacks? Basically, it would have meant that although over 300 million 
Americans had been constrained in their liberties to provide a better S2 for just over 3000 
people. Now, I am not arguing that this legislation shouldn’t have been there before 
September 11 to prevent the truly tragic loss of life. I do think, however, that this drastically 
changes the way we look at considerations that involve concern for the common good, or 
concern for the good of an enormous amount of people. It seems the reason that measures 
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claiming to promote the common good are so popular among a lot of people is because of the 
high level of uncertainty. You never know if you are the one who is going to be murdered 
under S1 but will survive under S2. I am convinced that his hope for a possible better situation 
is a major reason for a lot of individuals to willingly give up their privacy and other civil 
liberties in exchange for these security-enhancing measures.
But what about privacy? Does that work the same way as security? I would argue that 
it does, but there are two differences that must be discussed here. The first difference is that 
often a lot more individuals are involved than noted in the considerations about security above 
(which we can see from the example of 300 million individuals versus 3000 individuals). In 
the case of the surveillance cameras, the policy decreases the privacy of everyone who is 
being filmed in the street. This means that everyone’s P1 will drop to a lower P2 when the 
surveillance cameras are installed. How much it drops depends on what is being done with the 
images that the cameras capture, but it is undeniable that everyone who gets filmed has his 
privacy reduced.
To conclude this chapter, it must be underlined that a lot of discussions about privacy 
and security are conducted in the wrong way by displaying privacy as something that only 
benefits one individual, while security benefits everyone. It was observed that security only 
benefits those whose situation is actually affected. Surveillance cameras that allegedly reduce 
crime in Amsterdam, for example, cannot be said to increase my security because I never go 
to Amsterdam. And cameras that are placed in an area where previously there was no crime at 
all also do not increase security because the status quo does not actually change. Thus, when 
discussing specific policy measures to increase security, we should always consider who are 
involved in a different way.
43
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
In my thesis, I have tried to answer the following question: which conditions should be 
fulfilled for governments to be justified to restrict the privacy of individuals? Unfortunately, 
the answer to this question is not a neat checklist with a number of conditions that have to be 
fulfilled, with the indication that when these are fulfilled, the government is justified to 
restrict the privacy of individuals in order to improve security. Real life cases are too complex 
for such a simple checklist, and decisions should always be made with regard of the context.
There are, of course, some rules that the government should follow when they restrict 
privacy. Authors like Westin and Etzioni have introduced such rules, by stating that there 
should actually be an improvement of security before privacy may be restricted, and that the 
measure should be as minimally intrusive as possible. Governments should follow these rules, 
but that still does not help them in dilemmas where they have to choose between defending 
security and defending privacy.
In this thesis I have tried to show that the way how governments look at restricting 
privacy can be improved. By viewing security and privacy as more than just goods that the 
government should provide for its citizens, but as rights that every individual has. I have 
argued that we have a right to privacy and a right to security, and that both of these rights can 
be defended from a consequentialist point of view and a deontological one. And when there is 
a dilemma between defending one right or the other, I think that actions that violate rights 
need a stronger defense than inactions that violate rights. Governments therefore have more 
responsibility for the consequences of their actions than for the consequences of their 
inactions. This means that they have more responsibility for the violations of the right to 
privacy than for the violations of the right to security that are committed by other agents.
Governments should also look closely at whose rights are actually involved in the 
decision. In a lot of cases privacy is displayed as an individual good while security is 
displayed as a common good, which would make it somehow more important than privacy. 
Contrasted to this, I have argued that the only actors involved are those who are being 
affected by the privacy-violating measure: only people whose right to privacy is violated and 
only people whose security is being increased. The common good, and individuals who are 
not affected by the government measure, do not play a role in the discussion about it.
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The burden of proof that the privacy violation is justifiable in light of the alleged 
consequences lies with the government, not with any citizens who might object to their right 
to privacy being violated.
It must be admitted that making these decisions is hard, but that is because the stakes 
are high and there are fargoing consequences for a lot of people. In the end, I think that a 
majority of privacy-violating measures that are in effect in numerous countries at this 
moment, would not pass a thorough examination of whether they are justified or not. As a 
matter of fact, there are a lot of these measures that will be justified, and they are very 
important for everyone because they are preventing the violation of the right to security. I 
hope that the conclusions of my thesis can serve as a different way of how governments look 
at privacy-violating measures.
A lot of work needs to be done, though. Privacy and security are very important issues, 
and no government should take measures that violates rights lightly. For future research, I 
believe two things would improve the way we deal with privacy in Western countries even 
more. First of all, we need to determine what types of private information we should protect 
via a right to privacy. This is not an easy task, and I have given some pointers of how it can be 
done in chapter III. Secondly, existing government policies that violate the privacy of 
individuals should be evaluated. Their effectiveness should be tested, and we should 
determine whether the violation of the right to privacy that they cause is justified. If this is 
done, I believe we can really change Western democracies to countries where the right to 
security is protected and the right to privacy is respected. Or, to return to the metaphor of 
Bentham’s Panopticon, we can realize societies where individuals are not treated as prisoners 
that need to be under continuous observation.
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